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A B S T R A C T
This paper presents a set of energy and resource intensive scenarios based on the concept of Shared
Socio-Economic Pathways (SSPs). The scenario family is characterized by rapid and fossil-fueled
development with high socio-economic challenges to mitigation and low socio-economic challenges to
adaptation (SSP5). A special focus is placed on the SSP5 marker scenario developed by the REMIND-
MAgPIE integrated assessment modeling framework. The SSP5 baseline scenarios exhibit very high levels
of fossil fuel use, up to a doubling of global food demand, and up to a tripling of energy demand and
greenhouse gas emissions over the course of the century, marking the upper end of the scenario literature
in several dimensions. These scenarios are currently the only SSP scenarios that result in a radiative
forcing pathway as high as the highest Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP8.5). This paper
further investigates the direct impact of mitigation policies on the SSP5 energy, land and emissions
dynamics conﬁrming high socio-economic challenges to mitigation in SSP5. Nonetheless, mitigation
policies reaching climate forcing levels as low as in the lowest Representative Concentration Pathway
(RCP2.6) are accessible in SSP5. The SSP5 scenarios presented in this paper aim to provide useful
reference points for future climate change, climate impact, adaption and mitigation analysis, and broader
questions of sustainable development.
ã 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Climate change and sustainable development are central global
and long-term challenges facing humankind today. Scenarios of* Corresponding author.
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0959-3780/ã 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articsocietal developments over the 21st century are a primary tool for
investigating the scope and evolution of these challenges, and
therefore have been used in climate change research for a long time
(Leggett et al., 1992). In the past years, a new scenario framework
for climate change research has been presented that further
systematizes the exploration of relevant socio-economic futures
for climate policy analysis (Ebi et al., 2014; van Vuuren et al., 2014;
O’Neill et al., 2014; Kriegler et al., 2014a). To this end, a set of ﬁvele under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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different levels of socio-economic challenges to the two generic
policy responses to climate change, mitigation and adaption (SSP1
to SSP5; Kriegler et al., 2012; O’Neill et al., 2014; O’Neill et al., 2017).
The associated scenarios aim to facilitate and integrate future
research on mitigation, adaptation and residual climate impacts
and are thus targeting climate change researchers and climate
policy analysts. Even though the SSP scenarios were developed for
climate change research as primary recipient, they are also highly
relevant for investigating broader questions of sustainable
development (O’Neill et al., 2017).
This paper describes the energy, land-use, and emissions
outcomes in a future unfolding according to SSP5, called “Fossil-
Fueled Development”. SSP5 is characterized by high socio-
economic challenges to mitigation and low socio-economic
challenges to adaptation (O’Neill et al., 2017). It describes a world
of resource intensive development, where high economic growth
is combined with material intensive production and consumption
patterns and a strong reliance on abundant fossil fuel resources.
This leads to high levels of greenhouse gas emissions, and to large
challenges to reduce them in response to climate change. At the
same time, the SSP5 narrative foresees a peak and decline in global
population, rapid human development, fast income convergence
between regions and an increasingly inclusive and globalized
economy, giving rise to high and growing adaptive capacity to
climate change (see Section 5 of the supplementary online
material (SOM) for a full description of the SSP5 narrative
reproduced from O’Neill et al. (2017). There have been a number
of narratives in the global scenarios literature (Raskin et al., 2005)
with some resemblance to the SSP5 narrative including the Market
Forces and Markets First Narratives of the Global Scenario Group
(Raskin et al., 2010) and the Global Enviromental Outlook (UNEP,
2003), respectively, the global orchestration narrative of the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Carpenter et al., 2005), and
the A1FI scenario family of the IPCC Special Report on emissions
scenarios (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000).
The analysis is part of a multi-model exercise to generate
a range of energy-land-economy-climate scenarios for the full
set of SSPs with a collection of integrated assessment models
(IAMs) (Riahi et al., 2017; Bauer et al., 2017; Popp et al., 2017).
To streamline the use of the SSP5 scenario in future applications,
a single IAM marker scenario was selected among the SSP5
scenarios—for recommended use in applications which cannot
consider the full set of IAM scenarios. The SSP5 marker scenario
was developed with the REMIND-MAgPIE integrated assessment
modeling framework (Popp et al., 2011; Bauer et al., 2014).
Four companion papers in this special issue describe the
marker scenarios for the other SSPs (SSP1 IMAGE, van
Vuuren et al., 2017; SSP2 MESSAGE-GLOBIOM, Fricko et al.,
2017; SSP3 AIM/CGE, Fujimori et al., 2017; SSP4 GCAM, Calvin
et al., 2017).
The SSP5 emissions outcomes can be compared with earlier
“high emissions” scenarios following storylines with some
resemblance to SSP5. This includes in particular the emissions
scenario underlying the highest Representative Concentration
Pathway (RCP) reaching a radiative forcing of 8.5 W/m2 by the end
of the century (RCP8.5; Riahi et al., 2011) and the A1FI scenario
family in the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES;
Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000). We will provide a quantitative
comparison of the SSP5 scenarios with those scenarios as well as
with the range of baseline and mitigation scenarios in the
emissions scenario database of the Fifth Assessment Report
(AR5) of Working Group III of the IPCC (IPCC, 2014).
The SSP5 scenario family presented in this study is built
around a SSP5 baseline scenario without dedicated climate policy
and without impacts of climate change and other dimensions ofglobal environmental change on society. This scenario aims to
provide a baseline case for future investigations of mitigation,
adaptation and residual climate impacts. Of course, accounting
for climate impacts and climate policies can signiﬁcantly alter the
energy, land-use, and emissions outcomes as well as other socio-
economic outcomes. In line with the conceptual approach of the
new scenario framework (van Vuuren et al., 2014), the impact of
policy interventions and climate change can be analyzed with
respect to this baseline to explore the contingency of future
developments on present and future actions. While much of this
analysis is subject to concurrent (e.g., Wiebe et al., 2015) or future
research, this study already presents a set of SSP5-based climate
change mitigation scenarios. The mitigation scenarios can be used
to assess the challenges to mitigation in SSP5 by exploring the
socio-economic consequences of reaching increasingly stringent
forcing targets.
While the paper focuses on the SSP5 marker scenario
developed by REMIND-MAgPIE, it will also explore the impact
of model choice and inherently uncertain assumptions about
future socio-economic and technological developments on the
scenario outcomes. Concerning the uncertainty about socio-
economic developments and future technologies, the SSP5
energy, land-use, emissions, and economic outcomes will be
compared with SSP1, a sustainability oriented world with low
challenges to mitigation and adaptation (O’Neill et al., 2017; van
Vuuren et al., 2017) and a middle-of-the road development in
SSP2, a world with intermediate challenges to mitigation and
adaptation (Fricko et al., 2017). Concerning the impact of model
choice and differences in the implementation of the SSP5
narrative, the paper will compare the SSP5 marker scenario with
alternative interpretations of SSP5 by the GCAM (Calvin et al.,
2017), WITCH-GLOBIOM (Emmerling et al., 2016), and AIM/CGE
(Fujimori et al., 2017) integrated assessment models. Still, the
deep uncertainty about long-term developments gives rise to a
myriad of choices in projecting the energy, land use, and
emissions outcomes even within the bounds of the SSP5
narrative. Therefore the range of SSP5 projections may still
increase as more SSP5 interpretations from other models or SSP5
model sensitivity studies become available.
Further information about the SSP scenarios can be found at
https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/SspDb.
2. Methods
2.1. The REMIND-MAgPIE integrated assessment modeling framework
The REMIND-MAgPIE integrated assessment modeling frame-
work consists of an energy-economy-climate model (REMIND)
(Bauer et al., 2008, 2012; Leimbach et al., 2010a,b; Luderer et al.,
2013, 2015) coupled to a land-use model (MAgPIE) (Lotze-Campen
et al., 2008; Popp et al., 2010, 2014b). REMIND (Regional Model of
Investment and Development) is an energy-economy general
equilibrium model linking a macro-economic growth model with a
bottom-up engineering based energy system model. It covers
eleven world regions, differentiates various energy carriers and
technologies and represents the dynamics of economic growth and
international trade (Leimbach et al., 2010a,b; Mouratiadou et al.,
2016). A Ramsey-type growth model with perfect foresight serves
as a macro-economic core projecting growth, savings and invest-
ments, factor incomes, energy and material demand. The energy
system representation differentiates between a variety of fossil,
biogenic, nuclear and renewable energy resources (Bauer et al.,
2012, 2016a,b; Klein et al., 2014a; Pietzcker et al., 2014a,b). The
model accounts for crucial drivers of energy system inertia and
path dependencies by representing full capacity vintage structure,
technological learning of emergent new technologies, as well as
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sions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and air pollutants are largely
represented by source and linked to activities in the energy-
economic system (Streﬂer et al., 2014a,b). Several energy sector
policies are represented explicitly (Bertram et al., 2015), including
energy-sector fuel taxes and consumer subsidies (Schwanitz et al.,
2014). The model also represents trade in energy resources (Bauer
et al., 2015).
MAgPIE (Model of Agricultural Production and its Impacts on
the Environment) is a global multi-regional economic land-use
optimization model designed for scenario analysis up to the year
2100. It is a partial equilibrium model of the agricultural sector that
is solved in recursive dynamic mode. The objective function of
MAgPIE is the fulﬁlment of agricultural demand for ten world
regions at minimum global costs under consideration of biophysi-
cal and socio-economic constraints. Major cost types in MAgPIE are
factor requirement costs (capital, labor, fertilizer), land conversion
costs, transportation costs to the closest market, investment costs
for yield-increasing technological change (TC) and costs for GHG
emissions in mitigation scenarios. Biophysical inputs (0.5 resolu-
tion) for MAgPIE, such as agricultural yields, carbon densities and
water availability, are derived from a dynamic global vegetation,
hydrology and crop growth model, the Lund-Potsdam-Jena model
for managed Land (LPJmL) (Bondeau et al., 2007; Müller and
Robertson, 2014). Agricultural demand includes demand for food
(Bodirsky et al., 2015), feed (Weindl et al., 2015), bioenergy (Popp
et al., 2011), material and seed. For meeting the demand, MAgPIE
endogenously decides, based on cost-effectiveness, about intensi-
ﬁcation of agricultural production (TC), cropland expansion and
production relocation (intra-regionally and inter-regionally
through international trade) (Dietrich et al., 2014; Lotze-Campen
et al., 2010; Schmitz et al., 2012). MAgPIE derives cell speciﬁc land-
use patterns, rates of future agricultural yield increases (Dietrich
et al., 2014), food commodity and bioenergy prices as well as GHG
emissions from agricultural production (Bodirsky et al., 2012; Popp
et al., 2010) and land-use change (Humpenöder et al., 2014; Popp
et al., 2014b).
Emissions in the land-use and energy sectors are interlinked
by overarching climate policy objectives and the deployment of
bioenergy (Klein et al., 2014b; Popp et al., 2014a; Rose et al., 2014).
REMIND and MAgPIE models are coupled to establish an
equilibrium of bioenergy and emissions markets in an iterative
procedure (Bauer et al., 2014). The atmospheric chemistry-
climate model MAGICC (Meinshausen et al., 2011) is used to
evaluate the climate outcomes of the REMIND-MAgPIE emission
pathways. More details about the REMIND-MAgPIE modeling
framework and the coupling approach can be found in Section S2
of the SOM.
2.2. Implementation of SSPs
REMIND-MAgPIE so far developed integrated energy-land-
economy-climate scenarios for SSP5 (Fossil Fueled Development;
this article), SSP1 (Sustainability; van Vuuren et al., 2017) and SSP2
(Middle of the Road; Fricko et al., 2017). REMIND-MAgPIE scenarios
for SSP3 (Regional Rivalry; Fujimori et al., 2017) and SSP4
(Inequality; Calvin et al., 2017) that are characterized by stronger
inter- and intraregional disparities than SSP1, 2, and 5 are a subject
of future work.
The interpretation of SSP1, 2 and 5 by REMIND-MAgPIE is based
on the SSP narratives (O’Neill et al., 2017) and more detailed energy
and land-use speciﬁcations developed for the SSP interpretations
by IAMs (Riahi et al., 2017). Model assumptions and parameters
directly relating to these features were identiﬁed, and varied across
the three SSPs (Table 1). Further details on the parameter
variations are provided in Section S3 of the SOM.Population projections are an exogenous input to REMIND-
MAgPIE and are directly taken from the country-level population
projections for SSP1, 2, and 5 (KC and Lutz, 2017). Regional
economic output is deduced from the SSP country-level projec-
tions of gross domestic product (GDP) by the OECD team (Dellink
et al., 2017). GDP is an endogenous variable in REMIND, largely
driven by exogenous assumptions about labor productivity
increases. Those were adjusted to reproduce the GDP projections
in the SSP baseline cases. The mitigation scenarios show an
endogenous GDP response to mitigation policies which can serve
as a measure for the challenges to mitigation in the individual SSPs
(see Section 5).
SSP5 scenarios have also been produced by the AIM/CGE, GCAM,
and WITCH-GLOBIOM integrated assessment models. Their
implementation of SSP5 is brieﬂy summarized in Section S3.3 of
the SOM.
2.3. Implementation of mitigation scenarios
The SSP mitigation scenarios were derived by implementing
mitigation policies in the SSP baselines aiming at a climate forcing
target in 2100. The target levels of anthropogenic climate forcing
were chosen to be consistent with the 2100 forcing levels obtained
by the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs; van Vuuren
et al., 2011), i.e., RCP6.0 (Scenario SSP5-6.0; reaching about 5.4 W/
m2 as estimated by the reduced-form atmospheric chemistry-
climate model MAGICC; Riahi et al., 2017), RCP4.5 (SSP5-4.5; about
4.2 W/m2) and RCP2.6 (SSP5-2.6; 2.6 W/m2). In addition, an
intermediate forcing level of 3.4 W/m2 was investigated.
Since such policies are not only characterized by the long term
forcing target, but also by other factors such as their regional,
sectoral and temporal proﬁle, their qualitative features were
harmonized across IAMs by use of shared climate policy
assumptions (SPAs, Kriegler et al., 2014a). A detailed discussion
of the SPAs can be found in Riahi et al. (2017). In the energy sector,
regionally fragmented carbon pricing as implied by existing
climate policy pledges was assumed until 2020 (Kriegler et al.,
2015), followed by a transition period to globally uniform carbon
pricing at the level mandated by the long term forcing target in
2100. The assumptions about the transition period reﬂected
different abilities to establish effective international cooperation
to solve environmental problems in the SSPs (see Table 1): full
global cooperation after 2020 in SSP1, and transition to a global
carbon price from 2020 to 2040 in SSP2 and SSP5. Both SSP1 and
SSP5 assume effective institutions to manage land-use, and
therefore associated SPAs assume effective pricing of land-use
emissions at the level of the energy sector. In SPA2, the control of
emissions from land conversion is weaker in the near term so that
deforestation is not fully eliminated before 2030. A detailed
description of the SPA implementation in REMIND-MAgPIE is
provided in Section S4 of the SOM.
The SPAs try to incorporate short term climate policy develop-
ments in the long term mitigation scenarios. Although they were
formulated before the adoption of the Paris Agreement in
December 2015, they are to some extent compatible with the
intended nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to the
agreement, particularly for SSP2 (SOM Figs. S4.2 and S4.3).
Remaining differences are within the range of the uncertainty
about the ﬁnal scope of NDCs and in particular their actual
implementation, which will be inﬂuenced by the underlying socio-
economic pathway the world will follow in the coming decades.
2.4. Regional reporting
Scenario outcomes are provided on the global level and the
level of ﬁve macro-regions: Latin America (LAM), Middle East and
Table 1
Overview of the SSP implementation in REMIND-MAgPIE. The table links the implementation settings (right columns) to the associated high level characterization of SSPs in
O’Neill et al. (2017) (left columns). HICs stands for High Income Countries. The concrete implementation was based on more detailed speciﬁcations of energy and land-use
characteristics developed for the IAM interpretations of SSPs (Riahi et al., 2017); SOM Tables S3.1 and S3.5). A detailed quantitative description of the SSP implementation in
REMIND-MAgPIE is provided in SOM Section S3.
Narrative (O’Neill et al., 2017) REMIND-MAgPIE implementation
Indicator SSP1 – Sustainability SSP2 – Middle of the Road SSP5 – Fossil Fueled
Development
Parameter SSP1 SSP2 SSP5
Demographics
Population
growth
Low (medium fertility in HICs) Medium Low (high fertility in
HICs)
Population KC and Lutz (2017)
Migration Medium Medium High
Economy & lifestyle
GDP growth
(per capita)
High (medium in HICs) Medium, uneven High GDP/cap
growth
Dellink et al. (2017)
Inequality Reduced Uneven, reduced moderately Strongly reduced GDP/cap
convergence
Dellink et al. (2017)
Traditional
biomass use
Rapid phase-
out
Intermediate
phase-out
Rapid phase-
out
Globalization Connected markets Semi-open global economy Strong Regional
capital
intensities
Converging Non-
converging
Converging
International
trade
Moderate Moderate High Capital
markets
Global Global Global
Energy
markets
Global Global Global
Agricultural
trade
Global Regional Global
Consumption Low material consumption Material intensive Materialism, Status
consumption, High
mobility
Energy
demand
Low Medium High
Transport
liquids
Low Medium High
Diet Low meat diets Medium meat consumption Meat-rich diets Calories per
capita
Low Medium High
Livestock
share
Low Medium High
Technology
Development Rapid Medium, uneven Rapid GDP/cap
growth
Dellink et al. (2017)
Energy
technology
change
Directed away from fossil fuels,
toward efﬁciency, renewables
Some investment in
renewables, continued
reliance on fossil fuels
Directed toward fossil
fuels; alternative
sources not actively
pursued
Renewable
energy
Favorable
outlook
Intermediate
outlook
Pessimistic
outlook
Nuclear
energy
Pessimistic Intermediate Intermediate
CCS Intermediate Intermediate Favorable
Environment & resources
Fossil
constraints
Preferences shift away from
fossil fuels
No reluctance to use unconv.
Resources
None Oil, coal and
gas resources
Low Medium High
Land-use Strong regulations to avoid
environmental tradeoffs
Medium regulations lead to
slow decline in the rate of
deforestation
Medium regulations
lead to slow decline in
the rate of
deforestation
Forest
protection
rate
High Medium Medium
Agriculture Improvements in ag
productivity; rapid diffusion of
best practices
Medium pace of tech change
in ag sector; entry barriers to
ag markets reduced slowly
Highly managed,
resource-intensive,
rapid increase in
productivity
Crop
productivity
Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous
Livestock
productivity
Medium/
high
Medium High
Nutrient
efﬁciency
High Medium Low
Biomass
supply (2nd
generation)
Low Medium High
Policies & institutions
International
cooperation
Effective Relatively weak Effective for
development, limited
for environment
See international trade settings above, and discussion of
SPAs in Section 2.3
Environmental
(and energy)
policy
Improved management of local
and global issues; tighter
regulation of pollutants
Concern for local pollutants
but only moderate success in
implementation
Focus on local
environment, little
concern with global
problems
Air pollutant
control
High Medium High
Bioenergy
tax
High Medium to
high
High
Fossil fuel
policies
(Subsidies/
taxes)
Restrictive Intermediate Supportive
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reforming economies of the former Soviet Union (REF), and the
original OECD countries (in 1990) plus European Union and
candidate countries (OECD) (Riahi et al., 2017; https://secure.iiasa.
ac.at/web-apps/ene/SspDb). Since the native model regions of
REMIND-MAgPIE are not perfect subsets of these macro-regions,
small deviations between the deﬁnition of these regions and the
country groups mapped to these regions by REMIND-MAgPIE exist
(SOM Section S2.4).
3. Energy and food demand and their drivers in SSP5
Energy and food demand are strongly inﬂuenced by population
and economic developments. Food demand was constructed
exogenously based on SSP5 population and economic output
trajectories and additional assumptions in the SSP5 narrative (SOM
Section S3.2), and remained unchanged between baseline and
mitigation cases. Energy demand is an endogenous output of the
REMIND model, and differs between baseline and mitigation cases
due to changes in energy mix and energy prices.
3.1. Population
SSP5 is a world with a fast demographic transition in
developing countries driven by improving education, health, and
economic conditions, and a stabilization of fertility rates above
replacement levels in high income countries due to optimistic
economic outlooks (KC and Lutz, 2017). Migration from poorer to
wealthier countries further bolsters the dynamic population
development in industrialized countries. The starkly different
trends in population before and after 2050 are an important
feature of SSP5 affecting associated energy, emissions and land use
projections. Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst half of the century population
is increasing in all regions except the reforming economies (REF),
and after 2050 it is decreasing in all regions except in the Middle
East and Africa (MAF) and high income OECD regions. Globally,
population peaks at around 8.6 billion between 2050 and 2060
followed by a decline to 7.4 billion in 2100 (Fig. 1, top row). Overall,
global population growth is projected to be similar to SSP1 and
slower than in SSP2 and the UN medium projection (United
Nations, 2015) in all regions except OECD. It is also similar to the
SRES A1FI scenario family (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000), but
signiﬁcantly lower than in the high population RCP8.5 scenario
(Riahi et al., 2011).
3.2. Economic output
Economic growth is rapid in developing countries and high in
industrialized countries, with a strong convergence of income
levels between countries. GDP per capita levels by the end of the
century are projected to increase by factors of 5 (OECD; annual
average growth of 1.8%/yr) to 28 (MAF; 3.8%/yr) relative to 2010,
reaching 120 thousand (MAF) to 160 thousand (OECD) US Dollars
per year in 2100 (in purchasing power parity (PPP) units; Dellink
et al., 2017). This translates into a rapid increase of global economic
output from 67 trillion USD in 2010 to 360 trillion USD in 2050 and
1000 trillion USD (PPP) in 2100 (Fig. 1, upper middle row). End of
century economic output in SSP5 is almost twice as high as in SSP2
and SSP1, with the strongest differences in OECD due to the
compounding effects of signiﬁcantly higher population and GDP
per capita growth. Income convergence between developing and
industrialized countries is equally rapid in SSP1 and SSP5, but at
lower overall income levels in SSP1 due to less emphasis on
economic growth in high income countries. Since the SSP
economic output assumptions are speciﬁed in PPP units, the
GDP values cannot directly be compared to GDP projections basedon market exchange rates as reported for emissions scenarios in
the literature. However, GDP information in PPP is available for
A1FI (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000) and a subset of scenarios in the
AR5 scenario database (IPCC, 2014). They all assume slower global
economic growth over the 21st century than SSP5.
3.3. Energy demand
Historically, energy intensity of economic output decreased and
per capita energy use increased with increasing GDP per capita
levels (Grübler et al., 2012; Fouquet, 2014). In SSP2 and SSP5, the
developing regions MAF, ASIA, and LAM exhibit a roughly constant
growth of per capita ﬁnal energy demand with income, while in
the OECD and REF regions, it saturates starting from considerably
higher levels of per capita energy use (SOM Fig. S1.1). The resulting
ﬁnal energy intensity improvement rates over the century range
from 1.2%/yr in OECD to 2.3%/yr in MAF in line with historic trends
in developing and industrialized countries (Grübler et al., 2012;
Stern, 2012; IEA, 2015). In the sustainability oriented world
described by SSP1, per capita energy demand grows signiﬁcantly
slower with income in the developing regions and even decreases
in OECD and REF. As a result, global ﬁnal energy demand in SSP5
(1170 EJ/yr) is more than twice as high as in SSP1 (470 EJ/yr) by the
end of the century, with SSP2 positioned in between these two
cases (Fig. 1, lower middle row). This trend in energy demand is
conﬁrmed by other interpretations of SSP5 by AIM/CGE, GCAM and
WITCH-GLOBIOM, which ﬁnd global energy demand levels in 2100
between 980 and 1190 EJ/yr (Figs. 3, SOM S1.3). SSP5 ﬁnal energy
demand levels are similar to RCP8.5 (Riahi et al., 2011) and at the
upper end of energy demand projections in the AR5 database
(IPCC, 2014), but signiﬁcantly lower than in A1FI (Nakicenovic and
Swart, 2000).
3.4. Food demand
Food demand reﬂects human metabolic requirements, but food
consumption is also a function of economic and social develop-
ment as consumption patterns, especially the share of livestock
products within diets and food waste, change with income
(Bodirsky et al., 2015). This is particularly true for SSP5, where
diets with high animal and waste shares prevail (Figs. 2 , SOM S3.7).
Under this assumption, the income dynamics in SSP5 result in
increasing per-capita food demand at household level (including
household waste) until late in the century, reaching a global
average crop demand of 3250 kcal/cap/day (45% higher than in
2010) and livestock demand of 860 kcal/cap/day (85% higher than
in 2010) in 2100 (Fig. 2). By 2100, SSP5 shows substantially higher
per-capita food demand (crops and livestock) across all regions
compared to SSP2 (3320 kcal/cap/day) and in particular compared
to SSP1 (2830 kcal/cap/day) with its emphasis on limiting meat
consumption and food waste (SOM Fig. S1.2). Total global food
demand by 2100, however, is similar in SSP2 and SSP5 (46 EJ/yr)
because population in SSP2 is substantially higher than in SSP5
(Fig. 1, bottom row). In contrast, total food demand in SSP1 (30 EJ/
yr) is considerably lower compared to SSP5 and SSP2 because of
the coincidence of lower population and lower per-capita food
demand in SSP1. Food demand projections in other SSP5 IAM
interpretations are lower than in the REMIND-MAgPIE marker
scenario (AIM/CGE: 3600 kcal/cap/day, 40 EJ/yr; GCAM: 3420 kcal/
cap/day, 39 EJ/yr).
Regional food demand in REMIND-MAgPIE is identical in the
baseline and climate policy scenarios, i.e., food demand is
insensitive to climate policy intervention. Regional food produc-
tion, however, differs between baseline and climate policy
scenarios because agricultural productivity and trade patterns
react to mitigation policies (SOM Figs. S1.9, S1.12).
Fig. 1. Energy and food demand and their drivers in the REMIND-MAgPIE baseline scenarios. Shown are global population (top row), GDP (in PPP; upper middle row), energy
demand (lower middle row), and food demand (bottom row) in SSP5 over the 21st century stacked by SSP region. The ﬁgure includes a comparison with SSP1 and SSP2 for the
years 2050 and 2100. SSP values are also compared with population, GDP and ﬁnal energy projections in the RCP8.5 (red marker, Riahi et al., 2011) and SRES A1FI marker
scenarios (blue marker, Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000) and the 5th to 95th percentile range in the AR5 emissions scenario database (grey bands; IPCC, 2014). Food energy
demand was not reported for these scenarios. RCP8.5 population (12.4 billion) and A1FI ﬁnal energy demand (1570 EJ) are outside the plot range in 2100. The food demand
categories of FAO and MAgPIE do not match perfectly, e.g., ﬁsh is not included in MAgPIE, causing a small gap between historic food demand (FAO) and our projections. (For
interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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Fig. 2. Regional per-capita food demand (kcal/cap/day) in SSP5 over the 21st century assumed by REMIND-MAgPIE. Food demand is split into demand for crops and livestock
products. The ﬁgure includes a comparison with SSP1 and SSP2 for the years 2050 and 2100.
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4.1. Transformation of the energy system in SSP5
High economic growth and rapid income convergence lead to
fast modernization of energy use (Fig. 3). The ﬁnal energy
consumption of solids is quickly phased out, whereas electricity,
transportation fuels and gases consumption grow rapidly. Largest
differences to SSP1 and SSP2 occur for transportation fuel
consumption driven by rapidly growing passenger transport and
freight transportation volumes in SSP5. In the mitigation scenarios,
climate policies induce a general decrease in ﬁnal energy demand,
and an acceleration of the modernization of energy use. These
general features are shared across the larger set of SSP5 scenarios,
with main differences between model projections occurring for
liquids consumption due to differences in transportation energy
use (SOM Fig. S1.3).
4.1.1. Energy transition in the SSP5 baseline scenarios
In the absence of climate policy, primary energy supply is
dominated by the economics of energy resource availability and
energy conversion technologies for the production of electricity,
liquids and gases, which strongly depends on the underlying
technology and resource assumptions in SSP5 (see Table 1 for an
overview and SOM Section S3.1 for a more detailed description of
these assumptions). Due to the assumption of plentiful fossil fuel
resources, fossil fuels continue to dominate the rapidly growing
primary energy supply (Fig. 4). Technological progress, supportive
policies and ﬂexible markets are globally increasing the supply of
natural gas and also oil in the ﬁrst half of the century. In the SSP5
marker scenario, oil peaks in 2050 at twice the production rate of
2010. The oil industry is the dominant supplier of liquid fuels until2050, and continues to be mostly used for the provision of liquids
after the peak (SOM Fig. S1.6). Natural gas extraction quadruples
and peaks in 2070, driven by rapidly increasing demand for
electricity generation in the ﬁrst half of the century (Fig. 4) and for
gaseous fuels, predominantly for space heating (SOM Fig. S1.7).
Coal experiences a renaissance as major primary energy source in
the second half of the century when its deployment is signiﬁcantly
increased for the production of electricity (Fig. 5) and liquids (SOM
Fig. S1.6) in the face of rising costs for oil and gas exploration and
high demand for liquid transportation fuels and gases (Figs. 3, SOM
S1.6, S1.7). Despite these developments, low local air pollution is
limited to low levels due to effective pollutant emissions controls
(see also Section 3.4).
Low public acceptance and policy support for renewable energy
lead to slower cost improvements and a more limited share of
renewable energy technologies than in SSP2 and particularly SSP1.
As a result, renewable energy only starts to be deployed at larger
scale by the end of the 21st century. Nuclear power is used only to a
very limited degree given its high costs relative to coal and gas ﬁred
power generation (Figs. 5, SOM S1.5). Other SSP5 baseline
scenarios show similar trends. Coal use increases over the 21st
century in all baseline scenarios, although the coal renaissance is
more limited in GCAM due to a larger and continuously increasing
oil supply in the liquids sector (SOM Fig. S1.4). Electricity
generation remains fossil fuel based, but models differ most
notably on the total amount of electricity, the share of coal vs. gas-
ﬁred power generation, and the choice between solar and wind
power by the end of the century (SOM Fig. S1.5).
The comparison of the SSP5 marker scenario with SSP1 and
SSP2 highlights the fundamental differences regarding the scale of
primary energy use and particularly the use of fossil fuels between
SSPs (Fig. 4). While RCP8.5 foresees a similar increase in overall
Fig. 3. Final energy demand by carrier in the SSP5 baseline scenario (top row) and the 4.5 W/m2 (SSP5-4.5) and 2.6 W/m2 (SSP5-2.6) mitigation cases (bottom row) as derived
by REMIND-MAgPIE. Results are compared with SSP1 and SSP2 for the years 2050 and 2100. The dots in the bar plots indicate ﬁnal energy demand projections across IAMs and
the white diamonds represent the SSP marker scenarios. The grey bands show the 5th to 95th percentile range of ﬁnal energy use in baseline and mitigation scenarios (580–
650 ppm CO2e scenarios compared to SSP5-4.5 and 430–480 ppm CO2e to SSP5-2.6) collected in the IPCC AR5 emissions scenario database (IPCC, 2014). SSP5 baseline values
are compared with the RCP8.5 (red marker, Riahi et al., 2011) and SRES A1FI marker scenarios (blue marker, value of 1570 EJ in the year 2100 above plot range; Nakicenovic and
Swart, 2000). Historic data is from IEA (2012). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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renaissance of coal is less pronounced due to lower coal to liquids
deployment in the 2nd half of the century (Riahi et al., 2011).
International trade of fossil fuels expands rapidly in the
globalized energy markets foreseen in SSP5, particularly for gas
and later on for coal (SOM Fig. S1.8). In the SSP5 marker scenario,
the coal renaissance makes coal by far the largest international
energy market in the second half of the 21st century, with traded
energy volumes up to ﬁve times the size of current oil and gas
markets. This allows OECD and REF to become large exporters of
coal to Asia and MAF countries, while the role of MAF as largest oil
and gas exporter declines. Thus, the geo-politics of international
energy markets changes completely over the course of the century
in the SSP5 baseline case.
4.1.2. Energy transition in the SSP5 mitigation scenarios
Climate change mitigation requires substantial changes in the
scale and structure of primary energy use (Fig. 4). Coal use
responds strongest. In the SSP5 marker scenarios, coal-ﬁred power
generation and solid coal use are phased out rapidly before 2050 in
both the intermediate (SSP5-4.5) and stringent (SSP5-2.6) mitiga-
tion cases despite the availability of CCS. This is due to the fact thatgas-ﬁred power plants with CCS are economically favored and the
amount of CO2 that can be sequestered per year is limited to ca. 27
GtCO2 (SOM Section S3.1.4). Coal CCS only becomes prominent as
an end-of-pipe technology in coal to liquids production in SSP5-4.5
(SOM Fig. S1.6). SSP5 mitigation scenarios from other IAMs see a
somewhat larger role for Coal CCS, including in the power sector,
but even in these cases it is not among the major mitigation
options for reaching stringent mitigation targets (SSP5-2.6; SOM
Figs. S1.4, S1.5) given the more favorable economics of other
options at high carbon prices.
In contrast to coal, the use of oil and gas continues to grow
rapidly until 2050 (SSP5-4.5) and 2040 (SSP5-2.6), respectively,
due to only moderate short-term climate policies as deﬁned by the
shared climate policy assumption for SSP5 (see Section 2.3 and
SOM Section S4). In the SSP5-4.5 marker scenario, natural gas
continues thereafter to supply most of a signiﬁcantly reduced
demand for gases in the energy end use sectors (Fig. S1.4) and in
combination with CCS remains an important source for electricity
generation (Fig. 3). Oil plays an even larger role in the liquids sector
than in the baseline case given that coal is no longer available as a
major substitute, and biofuels only replace a fraction of what was
supplied by coal to liquids (SOM Fig. S1.6). Biofuel production is
Fig. 4. Primary energy supply by source (in direct equivalent units) in the SSP5 baseline scenario (top row) and the 4.5 W/m2 (45) and 2.6 W/m2 (26) mitigation cases (bottom
row) as derived by REMIND-MAgPIE. Results are compared with SSP1 and SSP2 for the years 2050 and 2100. The dots in the bar plots indicate primary energy supply
projections across IAMs and the white diamonds represent the SSP marker scenarios. The grey bands show the range of primary energy projections in the AR5 scenario
database (see Fig. 3 for details). SSP5 baseline values are compared with the RCP8.5 (red marker) and SRES A1FI marker scenarios (blue marker, value of 2070 EJ in 2100 above
plot range). Historic data is from IEA (2012). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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sphere, thus off-setting some of the residual fossil fuel emissions.
Even though the SSP5 storyline assumes unfavorable conditions for
non-biomass renewables, the strong mitigation pressure leads to
massive upscaling of renewables in the power sector after 2050,
with wind and solar providing more than two thirds of electricity
by the end of the century (Fig. 5). The upscaling is seen across all
SSP5 mitigation scenarios. Despite the fact that models differ about
the relative share of renewable vs. nuclear power and the residual
use of fossil-fuel ﬁred power plants, renewable energy is the
largest source of electricity generation by 2100 in all mitigation
scenarios, while fossil fuel power generation with CCS is used only
to a limited degree in SSP5-2.6 (SOM Fig. S1.5).
In the stringent SSP5-2.6 mitigation case compatible with the
objective to limit global warming to 2C, purpose-grown bioenergy
use is strongly increased (Fig. S1.4) to substitute fossil fuels
particularly in the transportation sector and – in combination with
CCS – to withdraw large amounts of carbon dioxide from the
atmosphere to offset excess emissions from fossil fuel use and
residual emissions from the agricultural sector (Section 4.3).Residual fossil fuel use in 2100 differs signiﬁcantly between SSP5
projections, ranging between a complete phase-out (REMIND-
MAgPIE marker) and 500 EJ (AIM/CGE) due to different deploy-
ment levels of fossil and bioenergy CCS over the century (SOM
Fig. S1.4).
Mitigation leads to a collapse of the international coal market
and signiﬁcant reductions of oil and gas trade in the second half of
the century (SOM Fig. S1.8). However, oil trade can even increase in
the near term compared to the baseline case due to demand
reductions in exporter countries and a reduction of unconventional
oil supply in importer countries. Bioenergy trade grows signiﬁ-
cantly during the second half of the century.
4.2. Land-use change in SSP5
The SSP5 narrative assumes that land-use change is incom-
pletely regulated, i.e., tropical deforestation continues, although at
slowly declining rates over time. Crop yields are rapidly increasing.
Barriers to international trade are strongly reduced, and strong
globalization leads to high levels of international trade (see
Fig. 5. Electricity generation by source in the SSP5 baseline scenario (top row) and the 4.5 W/m2 (45) and 2.6 W/m2 (26) mitigation cases (bottom row) as derived by REMIND-
MAgPIE. Results are compared with SSP1 and SSP2 for the years 2050 and 2100. The dots in the bar plots indicate electricity generation projections across IAMs and the white
diamonds represent the SSP marker scenarios. The grey bands show the range of electricity projections in the AR5 scenario database (IPCC, 2014; see Fig. 3 for details). SSP5
baseline values are compared with the RCP8.5 scenario (red marker). Historic data is from IEA (2012). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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use dynamics under the increasing food (Figs. 1 and 2) and
bioenergy demand (Fig. 4) in SSP5.
4.2.1. Global land use change
As a result of the strongly increasing demand for food crops and
livestock products (Fig. 1), global cropland expands by about
300 Mha between 2005 and 2100 (peak in 2070 at 400 Mha) in the
SSP5-Baseline marker scenario by REMIND-MAgPIE (Fig. 6),
accompanied by an increase in global cereal crop yields of ca.
60% between 2005 and 2100 (SOM Fig. S1.9). Cropland expands
into forests but also at the expense of pastures. By 2100, the global
pasture and forest area in the SSP5 baseline scenario declines by
270 Mha and 220 Mha respectively (Fig. 6).
The spatial distribution of these changes is shown in the land
use maps included in the SOM (Fig. S1.10). Net global cropland
expansion in the SSP5-Baseline marker scenario is very similar to
the RCP 8.5 scenario (290 Mha by 2100; SOM Fig. S1.11). In contrast,
however, cropland in the RCP 8.5 scenario expands only into forest
and not into pasture areas. The expansion of cropland into pastures
in the SSP5-Baseline marker scenario is facilitated by productivity
gains in the livestock sector (SOM Fig. S3.8) and related shifts infeeding practices from roughages to more energy-rich feed
cultivated on cropland allowing for contraction of pasture area
in spite of growing demand for livestock products.
Global land-use change by 2100 in SSP5-Baseline is similar to
that in SSP2-Baseline because of similar total food demand (Fig. 1)
but differs substantially from land-use change in SSP1-Baseline. In
SSP1, food and especially livestock demand markedly decline in the
2nd half of the century resulting in large-scale abandonment of
cropland and pasture areas (520 Mha and 230 Mha respectively).
Regrowth of natural vegetation on those areas causes terrestrial
carbon sequestration, which is reﬂected in negative CO2 emissions
from land-use in SSP1-Baseline (Section 3.4). Biomass plays a
minor role in the energy mix of SSP5-Baseline. In 2100, dedicated
2nd generation bioenergy amounts to 3 EJ/yr (Fig. 3) and occupies
about 15 Mha (Fig. 6). This is similar in SSP2-Baseline but different
in SSP1-Baseline where bioenergy area increases to 140 Mha for
producing 35 EJ/yr in 2100.
Demand for dedicated energy crops is substantially higher in
climate mitigation scenarios because the combination of bioen-
ergy with CCS can provide energy and concurrently remove CO2
from the atmosphere. In SSP5-4.5 and SSP5-2.6, global bioenergy
crop demand increases to 170 EJ/yr and 410 EJ/yr by 2100
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Fig. 6. Global land-use change by land type relative to 2010 in the SSP5-Baseline scenario (top row) and the 4.5 W/m2 (45) and 2.6 W/m2 (26) mitigation cases (bottom row) as
derived by REMIND-MAgPIE. Results are compared with SSP1-Baseline and SSP2-Baseline for the years 2050 and 2100. “Other” land, which includes non-forest natural
vegetation, deserts and abandoned agricultural land, strongly increases in SSP1-Baseline towards the end of the century, associated with regrowth of natural vegetation. If the
carbon density of re-growing vegetation exceeds a threshold of 20 tC/ha, “Other” land is reclassiﬁed as “Forest”.
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mitigation scenarios compared to SSP5-Baseline renders bioenergy
the dominant driver for cropland expansion in the second half of
the century. By 2100, global bioenergy area amounts to 420 Mha in
SSP5-4.5 and 920 Mha in SSP5-2.6 (Fig. 6). These values are
comparable to global land requirements for bioenergy crop
production in GCAM (SSP5-4.5: 530 Mha; SSP5-2.6: 770 Mha)
and AIM/CGE (SSP5-2.6: 910 Mha; the value of 800 Mha in SSP5-4.5
is higher due to higher bioenergy use; see SOM Fig. S1.3) (SOM
Fig. S1.11).
In REMIND-MAgPIE, the increase of bioenergy area in the
mitigation scenarios is accompanied by higher bioenergy yields
than in SSP5-Baseline. Global average bioenergy crop yields in 2100
amount to 22 tDM/ha/yr in SSP5-4.5 and 25 tDM/ha/yr in SSP5-2.6,
compared to 11 tDM/ha/yr in SSP5-Baseline (SOM Fig. S1.9). In
contrast to SSP5-Baseline, cropland expands primarily into pasture
areas in the SSP5 mitigation scenarios because deforestation after
2010 is avoided by pricing CO2 emission from land-use change atthe same level as CO2 emissions in the energy sector (Figs. 6, SOM
S1.10). In contrast to SSP5, the REMIND-MAgPIE SSP2 mitigation
scenarios still show considerable deforestation (about 100 Mha by
2050) because the effective implementation of a carbon pricing
scheme in the land-use sector is delayed until 2030 (Section 2.3). In
the SSP1 mitigation scenarios, bioenergy is produced primarily on
areas that would have been abandoned in SSP1-Baseline, which
hampers the regrowth of natural vegetation and associated carbon
uptake. Afforestation occurs in the SSP5 mitigation scenarios by
GCAM and AIM/CGE (only SSP5-26), but is not accessible as
mitigation option in the REMIND-MAgPIE implementation of the
SSPs.
While global food/feed crop area increases in the beginning of
the century in the REMIND-MAgPIE SSP5 mitigation scenarios, it
starts to decline in 2040 in favor of bioenergy and returns to its
2005 level by 2100. To ensure the same food production in climate
mitigation scenarios as in SSP5-Baseline, cereal crop yields need to
increase at higher pace. Global average cereal crop yields in 2100
308 E. Kriegler et al. / Global Environmental Change 42 (2017) 297–315are above 5 tDM/ha/yr in SSP5-4.5 and SSP5-2.6, compared to
4.2 tDM/ha/yr in SSP5-Baseline and ca. 2.9 tDM/ha/yr in 2010 (SOM
Fig. S1.9). The strong contraction of pasture area in the climate
policy scenarios is facilitated by regional shifts in food production
according to comparative advantages (SOM Fig. S1.12) and higher
investments into agricultural research and development (yield-
increasing technological change), which increases the amount of
biomass grazed on a certain pasture area (grazing intensity). The
GCAM model shows similar pasture dynamics in SSP5-4.5 and
SSP5-2.6 as REMIND-MAgPIE, whereas AIM-CGE shows a relatively
small decline of pasture areas but strong contraction of other land
that is not covered by forest or used for agriculture (Fig. SOM S1.11).
4.2.2. Regional land use change patterns
In the SSP5-Baseline marker scenario, agriculture expands into
forests and other natural land primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa (as
part of MAF) and Latin America (LAM) (Figs. 7 , SOM S1.10). The
MAF region shows the highest increase in crop and livestock
demand throughout the 21st century in SSP5 (Fig. 1). The
associated cropland expansion in MAF causes the major part of
global deforestation by 2100 (Figs. 7, SOM S1.10). Despite the
increase in livestock demand, pasture area in MAF is relatively
stable throughout the century because of improved feeding
efﬁciencies and a shift from pasture to cropland based feed
production (SOM Fig. S3.8). At the same time, MAF becomes the
main exporter of livestock products in SSP5-Baseline (SOM
Fig. S1.12) due to a combination of strong reduction of barriers
for international trade (SOM Fig. S3.11), productivity increases in
crop and livestock systems (SOM Fig. S3.8), and the large
availability of pastureland in MAF, which accounts in 2005 for
about one third of global pasture area. The agricultural area in ASIA
in SSP5-Baseline is largely maintained after 2050 (Fig. 7) allowing
ASIA to become the main exporter of crops (SOM Fig. S1.12). In the
climate mitigation scenarios, bioenergy area expands in all regions
except REF. In SSP5-4.5 bioenergy cropland in 2100 is similar in
ASIA, LAM, MAF and OECD, whereas in SSP5-2.6 bioenergySSP5−Baseline SSP
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Fig. 7. Regional land-use change in SSP5-Baseline, SSP5-4.5 and production occupies substantially more land in ASIA and MAF
than in LAM and OECD (Fig. 7). The large-scale production of
bioenergy in the mitigation scenarios has repercussions on
agricultural trade patterns. In MAF, the extensive livestock
production on pasture areas in SSP5-Baseline is displaced by
bioenergy production in SSP5-2.6 (Fig. 7). Thus, livestock produc-
tion for export is shifted to other regions such as ASIA (SOM
Fig. S1.12).
4.3. Development of emissions in SSP5
The SSP5 baseline scenario exhibits a tripling of well-mixed
greenhouse gas (WMGHG) emissions from 50 GtCO2-eq in 2010 to
ca. 150 GtCO2-eq towards the end of the century (Figs. 8 , SOM
S1.13; range of 125–150 GtCO2eq/yr across the four SSP5
interpretations by IAMs). This massive increase is mostly driven
by the strong reliance on fossil fuels consistent with the narrative
of SSP5. In the SSP5-Baseline marker scenario, fossil fuel emissions
peak between 2080 and 2090 as even the abundant coal, oil and gas
resources in SSP5 become depleted (Fig. 4). The SSP5 emissions
exceed SSP2 emissions by more than 75% and SSP1 emissions by
more than a factor three mainly due to the very different
developments in the energy sector. There are also major differ-
ences in land-use CO2 emissions which fall to zero (SSP2 and SSP5)
or even turn negative due to CO2 uptake from vegetation regrowth
(SSP1) by the end of the century. In terms of regional breakdown,
the largest share of WMGHG emissions comes from the ASIA and
OECD regions, contributing more than a third of emissions each
throughout the century (SOM Fig. S1.14). The WMGHG emissions
from the MAF region increase seven fold until 2100 catching up
with OECD emissions by the end of the century.
The emissions scenario associated with RCP8.5 (Riahi et al.,
2011) and the SRES A1FI scenario family (Nakicenovic and Swart,
2000) come closest to SSP5 within the previous generations of
scenarios. Compared to these scenarios, the SSP5 marker
scenario shows higher CO2 emissions due to its larger coal use5−45 SSP5−26
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SSP5-2.6 by 2050 and 2100 as derived by REMIND-MAgPIE.
Fig. 8. Well-mixed greenhouse gases by source in the SSP5 baseline scenario (top row) and the 4.5 W/m2 (45) and 2.6 W/m2 (26) mitigation cases (bottom row) as derived by
REMIND-MAgPIE. Results are compared with SSP1 and SSP2 for the years 2050 and 2100, with RCP8.5 for SSP5-Baseline (red marker), and with the AR5 scenario database
(grey bands, see Fig. 3 for details). The dots in the bar plots indicate WMGHG emissions projections across IAMs and the white diamonds represent the SSP marker scenarios.
CH4, N2O, and F-gas emissions were converted to CO2-eq emissions using AR4 global warming potentials. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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of the emissions scenarios collected for AR5 (IPCC, 2014) and the
SSP5 scenarios generated by the other IAMs (Figs. 9 , SOM S1.13).
In contrast, the marker scenario is highest in CH4 emissions only
until 2040 when it peaks due to rapidly increasing livestock
productivity (SOM Fig. S3.8) and the peak in natural gas
production. Moreover, its N2O emissions stabilize in the second
half of the century and are lowest among SSP5 baseline
scenarios. F-Gas emissions come mostly from industry sources
and rise even more rapidly than CO2 emissions due to their close
coupling with GDP growth. In contrast, air pollutant emissions
including sulfate and carbonaceous aerosols (organic and black
carbon) are tightly controlled in SSP5 for environmental and
health reasons (Sections 2.2 and S3.1).
In the SSP5 mitigation cases, well-mixed GHG emissions are
reduced signiﬁcantly (Figs. 8, 9, SOM S1.13). Emissions are already
more than halved in the weakest mitigation scenario SSP5-6.0 with
particularly strong reductions in CH4 and F-gases. CO2 emissions
are further decreased with decreasing forcing target, and even
reach net negative levels by the end of the century in the most
stringent mitigation cases SSP5-3.4 and SSP5-2.6. Further reduc-
tions also occur for CH4 and particularly F-gases, although theysaturate for lower targets indicating a socket of residual emissions
that are hard to eliminate even at high marginal mitigation costs.
The N2O emissions exhibit a considerably different response
pattern as they are rising with the stringency of forcing targets due
to increasing large-scale deployment of bioenergy. The residual
CH4 and N2O emissions give land-use and associated emissions a
large signiﬁcance in the mitigation cases (Figs. 8, SOM S1.13). Air
pollutant emissions are not much further reduced in the mitigation
cases due to the presence of already tight air pollutant control
measures in the baseline case. This implies that the air quality co-
beneﬁts of mitigation action are smaller in SSP5 than, e.g., in SSP2
(Rao et al., 2017). The shape of well-mixed GHG emissions in SSP5-
2.6 scenarios differs notably between models (SOM Fig. S1.13).
While the SSP5-2.6 marker by REMIND-MAgPIE shows smaller
emissions reduction until 2050 (reaching 34 GtCO2e in 2050
compared to 19 GtCO2e in AIM/CGE), it partly compensates it with
larger net negative emissions by the end of century (-11 GtCO2e
compared to 0.3 GtCO2e in AIM/CGE).
The emissions in the SSP5-Baseline marker scenario increase
anthropogenic climate forcing to 8.7 W/m2 by 2100, very close to
the forcing development in RCP8.5 (Fig. 10). The well-mixed GHGs
are responsible for the largest share of forcing, with the net
Fig. 9. Emissions of CO2, N2O, CH4, F-Gases, Sulfur and carbonaceous aerosols (OC + BC) for the SSP5 baseline and mitigation cases as derived by REMIND-MAgPIE. The SSP5
baseline emissions are compared with the emissions in the RCP8.5 and the A1FI marker scenario from SRES. Also shown are the funnels spanned by all SSP5 IAM
interpretations for SSP5-Baseline and SSP5-2.6 (lighter colors) and the 5th to 95th percentile range of emissions scenarios in the AR5 scenario database. Differences in base
year emissions are due to calibration to different data sources.
310 E. Kriegler et al. / Global Environmental Change 42 (2017) 297–315contribution of short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs) being rapidly
reduced due to the implementation of air pollution measures (SOM
Fig. S1.15). Forcing varies widely in the mitigation cases, ranging
from a deceleration of baseline trends (SSP5-6.0) to a peak and
decline of the forcing trajectory in the most stringent mitigation
cases (SSP5-3.4, SSP5-2.6). The resulting median global mean
temperature response (for a climate sensitivity of 3C) ranges from
5C warming since preindustrial times in the baseline case to 2C
warming in SSP5-2.6 offering only a median chance to stay below
the 2C target (Fig. 10). Thus, the SSP5-2.6 marker scenario exhibitsa higher overshoot than RCP2.6 due to rapid expansion of fossil fuel
use and only moderate climate policies in the near term.
5. The economics of SSP5 baseline and mitigation scenarios
The economic consequences of the different SSP assumptions
are particularly visible in the food and energy markets, which are
highly relevant for achieving development goals. Food prices,
reﬂecting the marginal production costs of food commodities,
decrease strongly (SSP1) or moderately (SSP5 and SSP2) in the SSP
Fig. 10. Radiative forcing and temperature in the SSP5 baseline and mitigation marker scenarios. The projections are compared with the RCP8.5 and the A1FI marker scenario
from SRES. Also shown are the funnels spanned by all SSP5 IAM interpretations for SSP5-Baseline and SSP5-2.6 (lighter colors) and the 5th to 95th percentile range in the AR5
scenario database.
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the combined effect of increasing agricultural productivity over
time (SOM Fig. S1.9) and the peak and decline (SSP1) or
stabilization (SSP5 and to a lesser degree SSP2) in food demand
(Fig. 1). Combined with signiﬁcant (SSP1 and SSP2) and very strong
(SSP5) growth in global economic output, the income share spent
on food (=food expenditure in percent GDP) decreases by an order
of magnitude until 2100 in SSP1 and SSP5, and somewhat slower,
but still by a factor three, in SSP2 (Fig. 12). Although the risk ofBaseline 4
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availability, the strong emphasis of the SSP1 and SSP5 narratives
on lessening inequality suggests that the number of undernour-
ished people will decline rapidly in these worlds.
In contrast, the price of electricity, as a proxy for the availability
of modern energy, increases in SSP5-Baseline (Fig. 11), particularly
in the second half of the century after gas and oil use have peaked
and coal is increasingly used for liquid fuel production (Fig. 3). This
compares to rather stable electricity prices in SSP1 and SSP2 as.5 2.6
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but also lower energy demand. However, the simultaneously
growing economic output results in a slight decrease in the income
share spent on energy (=energy expenditure in percent GDP) in
SSP5 despite the increase in energy prices and a strong increase of
energy demand. Energy expenditure shares are lower than in SSP2
(which features slower GDP growth), yet higher than in SSP1,
where energy expenditure is reduced by a factor of two by the end
of the century (Fig. 12). We thus conclude that SSP5-Baseline faces
no increase in economic challenges to cover its rapidly growing
energy demand due to rapid economic growth.
The economics of energy and land-use are signiﬁcantly altered
in the mitigation cases. Food prices increase due to more limited
availability of land for food production and the pricing of residual
emissions from agriculture. Energy prices increase as well since
fossil fuels are replaced with capital intensive low carbon
technologies at the margin. As a result in SSP5-2.6, food
expenditure no longer falls below 1% of GDP, but only halves to
2–3% by the end of the century. Energy expenditure increase to a
peak at nearly 10% during the main low carbon transition period
and then stabilizes at levels above 8% (Fig. 12). The mitigation
impacts on food and energy prices and expenditure shares are
much smaller in the SSP1 scenario due to its much lower energy
and food demand. This shows the important enabling effect of
energy efﬁciency (Riahi et al., 2012; Kriegler et al., 2014b; Luderer
et al., 2013) and low-meat diets (Popp et al., 2010) for mitigation
policies.
Mitigation measures are reﬂected in an effective price on
greenhouse gas emissions, which in the case of the shared climate
policy assumptions for SSP5 is moderate in the near term and
adapted towards the long-term forcing target after 2040 (see SOM
Section S4 for a detailed discussion). Fig. 13 (upper panel)
summarizes the resulting carbon prices in 2050. Carbon prices
increase strongly with forcing target, often more than doubling
when moving to the next level of stringency. However, the
underlying SSP assumptions have a similar large effect on carbon
prices, with SSP5 showing signiﬁcantly higher carbon price levels
than SSP1. Thus, much stronger policy intervention is needed in
SSP5 to push out abundant fossil fuels and dampen energy demand
growth (Kriegler et al., 2016).The scope of the mitigation challenges can also be measured in
terms of the direct macro-economic impacts of mitigation, as for
example measured by the reduction in household consumption
relative to the baseline case without mitigation policy (Clarke et al.,
2014). Importantly, this metric is a measure of gross mitigation
costs, and does not include reduced climate impacts nor the co-
beneﬁts or adverse side effects of mitigation. As shown in Fig. 13
(lower panel) the mid-century consumption losses in the
mitigation scenarios exhibit a similar pattern as the carbon prices,
with mostly a doubling of costs when moving to the next stringent
mitigation target, and fourfold or even higher mitigation costs in
SSP5 than SSP1. This conﬁrms the initial characterization of SSP5 as
a world with high socio-economic challenges to mitigation, in
contrast to SSP1 with low challenges and SSP2 with intermediate
challenges to mitigation.
6. Discussion
This paper presents the coupled energy, land-use, emission
scenarios associated with SSP5, and compares them with the SSP1
and SSP2 interpretations by the REMIND-MAgPIE integrated
assessment modeling framework, the SSP5 interpretations of
three other IAMs, and the RCP8.5 and SRES A1FI marker scenarios
from the literature. The fossil-fueled development in SSP5 leads to
a scenario with very high fossil fuel use, energy demand and CO2
emissions in the baseline. It marks the upper end of the scenario
literature in many of these dimensions as shown by a comparison
with the AR5 scenario database. The SSP5 emissions developments
in the baseline case result in a radiative forcing pathway very close
to RCP8.5. Nonetheless, mitigation measures can reduce emissions
strongly enough to forcing levels obtained in RCP2.6 in 2100, albeit
with a higher overshoot with only a median chance to limit mid-
century peak warming to 2C in the SSP5-2.6 marker scenario.
Therefore, SSP5 can be combined with climate model projections
based on all RCPs (with some qualiﬁcation for RCP2.6) within the
new scenario framework.
It is shown that the share of GDP spent on energy and food
continues to decrease in the SSP5 baseline case despite the rapid
increase in energy and food demand. This favorable economic
outlook is consistent with the SSP5 narrative of rapidly improving
Fig. 13. Carbon prices (upper panel) and consumption losses (lower panel; as
percent of consumption in the baseline case) for SSP1,2,5 (columns) and the 6.0, 4.5,
3.4, and 2.6 mitigation cases (rows). Results from the REMIND-MAgPIE SSP
scenarios are shown before the brackets, and the range across REMIND-MAgPIE,
AIM/CGE, WITCH-GLOBIOM, and GCAM (CO2 prices only. GCAM does not model
consumption losses) is shown in brackets. The SSP5-2.6 scenario was found
infeasible in WITCH-GLOBIOM, thus the upper end of the SSP5-2.6 range (*) cannot
be compared to the other matrix cells. Carbon prices and mitigation costs are highly
model dependent (Kriegler et al., 2014b, 2016), and therefore the focus is on the
relative change of these quantities between cells. IMAGE and MESSAGE-GLOBIOM
also derived SSP1 and SSP2 mitigation scenarios, but are not included here to
provide a comparison between matrix cells without sampling bias. The full range of
mitigation costs across all models and SSPs is presented in Riahi et al. (2017).
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higher food security. The paper investigates the direct impact of
mitigation policies on the physical and economic developments in
the energy, land and emissions sectors in SSP5 and conﬁrms the
assumption that SSP5 is a world with high socio-economic
challenges to mitigation. No analogous statement on the socio-
economic challenges to adaptation in SSP5 can yet be made, as both
the SSP5 baseline and mitigation scenarios in this study do not yet
account for climate change impacts, a subject of future research
(see Section 7).
The SSP5 scenarios are contingent on the SSP5 narrative, and
therefore should not be understood as a prediction of how the
future might evolve. The goal is to provide these scenarios as part
of a larger set of plausible SSP-based futures that differ strongly in
their baseline assumptions and implications for climate policy. Thepaper describes the uncertainty in the SSP5 scenario outcomes due
to the use of different interpretations of the SSP5 narrative within
four different integrated assessment models (AIM/CGE, GCAM,
REMIND-MAgPIE, WITCH-GLOBIOM). Generally, the variation of
energy-land-emissions outcome across SSPs (due to the different
storylines of the SSPs including socio-economic uncertainty)
appears to be larger than the model uncertainty. Model
uncertainty however is particularly signiﬁcant for land use changes
especially concerning pasture and forest areas, associated land use
change emissions, the primary energy mix in the mitigation cases,
and the magnitude of resulting carbon prices and mitigation costs.
Interestingly, the variation of consumption losses across SSPs in
REMIND-MAgPIE is of a similar order of magnitude than the
uncertainty in mitigation costs reported in the 5th Assessment
Report of the IPCC (Clarke et al., 2014). It will be an important
research questions to what extent model uncertainty in energy,
land-use, emission and economic outcomes associated with SSP5
will grow as more interpretations of SSP5 by a larger set of models
become available over time.
SSP5 combines the highest economic growth among the SSPs
with strong reliance on fossil fuels and energy intensive
consumption patterns because it was designed to describe a
world with very large challenges to mitigation, and not because it
hypothesizes high fossil fuel use and resource intensity to be a
precondition of high growth. A scenario with high economic
growth, but limited fossil fuel availability is also conceivable as for
example described by the A1T scenario in the SRES (Nakicenovic
and Swart, 2000) and the mitigation scenarios in this study.
Moreover, the scenario literature has repeatedly highlighted
transition scenarios with a focus on broader human well-being
rather than rapid economic growth (Raskin et al., 2005). In the SSP
family, this is represented by SSP1 with similarly rapid conver-
gence of income levels as in SSP5, but a focus on resource
efﬁciency, healthy diets and lowering environmental impacts.
7. Concluding remarks on future uses of SSP5
There are a number of speciﬁc research questions that the SSP5
scenario family is particularly suited for. First, it is an obvious
question whether strong economic growth, rapid development,
and effective institutions can actually materialize in the baseline
scenario with its massive greenhouse gas emissions and implied
very high climate change impacts. The SSP5 scenario family is
ideally suited to investigate this question about the limits to
adaptation, in particular since the narrative foresees a large
adaptive capacity due to rapid development and technological
progress. On the mitigation side, SSP5 is a world with a propensity
to engage in carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and other climate
engineering practices given its high challenges to mitigation and
its emphasis on technological solutions. Thus, SSP5 scenarios offer
a consistent context to analyze the impacts and side-effects of
deploying such technologies.
With their underlying high economic growth and resource
intensive consumption patterns, the SSP5 scenarios exhibit high
levels of exploitation of raw materials, high calorie and meat rich
diets, and potentially large waste streams raising questions about
their environmental sustainability beyond climate change. The
extent to which environmental sustainability and human and
economic development are interlinked has been a core concern of
global futures studies conducted by, e.g., the Global Scenario Group
(Raskin et al., 2010), the Global Environmental Outlook (UNEP,
2003) and the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment (Carpenter et al.,
2005). To this end, the SSP5 scenario family provides a new
generation of energy and resource intensive scenarios that can be
used to investigate a range of broader sustainable development
questions: to what extent are perceived environmental boundaries
314 E. Kriegler et al. / Global Environmental Change 42 (2017) 297–315beyond climate change transgressed, how much can this impact
economic growth and societal development, what mitigation and
adaptation measures in these dimensions can be implemented to
safeguard economic and human development, and how do these
challenges to sustainable development compare with the chal-
lenges in an SSP1 world emphasizing resource and energy
efﬁciency? We therefore conclude that the SSP5 scenario family
has multiple uses and can be expected to provide a range of new
insights on climate mitigation, adaptation and sustainable
development.
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